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LABOR LAW
What happens to unresolved grievances when the grievance
procedure does notprovidefor binding arbitration?
byJay E. Grenig






Argu ment Date: Oct. 10, 1990
ISSUE
In this case the Supreme Court is asked to determine
whether a discharged employee can seek to enforce a col-
lective bargaining agreement In court under Section 301
of the Federal Labor Management Relations where the col-
lective bargaining agreement does not provide for final and
binding arbitration.
FACTS
In 1985, Arthur Groves and Bobby Evans were dis-
charged by Ring Screw Works. Both were represented by
Local 771 of the UAW. The union and the employer had
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included
a five-step grievance procedure. The grievance procedure
provided that the parties would attempt to settle their
differences in the first four steps. If the grievance remained
unresolved at the conclusion of the fourth step, the un-
ion and the employer could call in an outside representa-
tive to assist in settling the difficultly. This could "include
arbitration by mutual agreement in discharge cases only."
If the dispute was not resolved at step five, the parties
agreed that the union's no-strike pledge and the employer's
no-lockout pledge in the agreement would not be
applicable.
After Evans and Groves were discharged, discussions
were conducted under the collective bargaining agree-
ment's grievance procedure. The discussions did not re-
suilt in settlement of the grievances, and the employer
refused the union's offer to take both cases to binding
arbitration.
Evans, Groves, and the union then filed suit, claiming
that the employer had breached the collective bargaining
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agreement by discharging Evans and Groves without just
cause. In an unreported opinion, the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division,
entered summary judgment in favor of the employer on
the ground that the plaintiffs were bound by the result of
the grievance procedures and could not seek judicial en-
forcement of the collective bargaining agreements in the
absence of proof that the union had violated its duty of
fair representation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the decision. (822 F'.2d 1061.) Groves,
Evans, and the union then sought review by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(29 U.S.C. § 185(a)) provides that "[sluits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion ... may be brought in any district court of the United
States." Section 203(d) of the LMRA states that "[final ad-
justment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of griev-
ance disputes arising over the application or interpretation
of an existing collective bargaining agreement."
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the substantive
law to be applied in suits brought under Section 301(a) was
federal law, which the courts must fashion from looking
at the policy of the legislation. The Court later held that
the national labor policy embodied in Section 203(d) could
be effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties for
settlement of their differences under the collective bar-
gaining agreement was given full play.
The Court in Vaca v, Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), recog-
nized two exceptions to this finality rule. First, an employee
can bring an action for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement against the employer, provided the employee
can prove the union breached its duty of fair representa-
tion in the handling of the grievance. Second, the finality
rule is inapplicable when the grievance procedure has been
repudiated by the employer.
Arbitration clauses are the most common provisions in
labor agreements for final adjustment of grievances. The
strike/lockout provision included by the parties here is less
common. The Supreme Court is now called upon to de-
termine whether the finality rule applies to a grievance
procedure that does not culminate in final and binding
arbitration.
52 PREVIEW
The federal courts of appeals have not agreed on the ap-
plicability of the finality rule to grievance procedures that
do not culminate in final and binding arbitration. In As-
sociated General Contractors v Illinois Conference of
Teamsters, 486 1E2d 972 (7th Cir. 1973), the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that, while it is one thing to hold that an arbitra-
tion clause In a contract agreed to by the parties is
enforceable, it is quite a different matter to construe a con-
tract provision reserving the union's right to resort to eco-
nomic recourse as an agreement to divest the courts of
jurisdiction to resolve whatever dispute may arise. The
Ninth Circuit followed the lead of the Seventh Circuit in
Dickeson v. DAW Forest Products, 827 E2d 627 (9th Cir.
1987).
However, in Fortune v. National 7hist Drill, 684 F.2d
374 (6th Cir. 1982), the Sixth Circuit stated that in the ab-
sence of a contractual provision for arbitration there is no
authority for the proposition that the federal courts have
the power to break a deadlock dispute over a grievance.
The court relied on the policy of Section 203(d) that, in
settling grievances, the method chosen by the parties
should be adhered to. It also held that an employee is
bound by the remedies that are bargained for by his or
her representative.
If the Supreme Court rules in favor of the employer, then
a union's ultimate recourse will be a test of economic
strength when an agreed-upon grievance procedure does
not culminate in final and binding arbitration. If the Su-
preme Court rules in favor of the union and the employees,
then the courts may be called upon to resolve grievances
where the parties have not agreed to final and binding
arbitration.
ARGUMENTS
For Arthur Groves, BobbyJ. Evans, and Local 771,
International Union UAW (Counsel of Record, Laur-
ence Gold, 815 16th Street, N.W, Washington, D.C. 20006;
telephone (202) 637-5290):
1. It should be wholly antithetical to the policies under-
lying Section 301 to construe an agreement that sim-
ply permits the use of economic force as precluding
judicial enforcement.
2. The principal purpose of Section 301(a) is to give the
federal courts the power to enforce collective bargain-
ing agreements.
3. In contrast to arbitration, the strike and lockout are
wholly unlike judicial enforcement of a contract and
cannot be implied to be a substitute for it.
4. The principle that an employee is bound by the reme-
dies that are bargained for by his or her representative
does not apply, where the agreement does not, ex-
pressly or by fair implication of fact or law, bar the ju-
dicial remedy provided by Section 301(a).
For Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Division
(Counsel of Record, Terence V Page; Clark, Hardy Lewis,
Pollard and Page, PC, 401 South Woodward Ave., Suite
400, Birmingham, M 48009; telephone (313) 645-0800):
1. Section 301 wais never intended to provide an aggrieved
employee and his or her union the opportunity to resur-
rect the grievance before the court if the end result of
the bargained-for dispute resolution contained in the
collective bargaining agreement is not to his or her
liking.
2. The method of dispute resolution contained in the col-
lective bargaining agreement is the final, binding and
exclusive remedy of the parties, whether or not the
agreement contains explicit finality language.
3. Any collective bargaining agreement containing a dis-
pute resolution process culminating in the right to strike
evinces the intent of the parties to reject outside adju-
dication absent qualifying language to the contrary.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener
Division
1. The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, Inc. (Counsel of Record, James D. Hol-
zhauer; Mayer, Brown & Platt; 2000 Pennsylvania
Ave., Washington, DC 20006; telephone (202)
463-2000).
2. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States (Coun-
sel of Record, Robin S. Conrad; National Chamber
Litigation Center Inc., 1615 H St., N.W, Washington,
DC 20062; telephone (202) 463-533 7).
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